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This paper is concerned with recent changes in the way capital-labour relations 
are regulated in German SMEs. By investigating 28 firm case-studies in the 
Ruhr Area, it is argued, first, that capital-labour relations in Germany are getting 
downscaled and decentralised, profoundly changing the traditional power 
geometry between capital and labour; second, that the regulatory landscape is 
being 'reworked' in terms favourable to capital during a period in which the 
latter is in the ascendancy in the labour market; and, third, that there is a 
peculiar spatial dimension to the rearticulation of power relations and core 
institutions of the German Model. 
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This paper investigates a group of small and medium firms in the 
Ruhr Area in the context of recent changes in the way capital-labour 
relations are governed and regulated in the region and in Germany 
(see Berndt, 1998a; Berndt, 1998b). It does so from a geographical 
perspective which links processes across different socio-spatial scales 
and stresses the importance of relative mobility differences in 
asymmetric power relations. Transformation processes are 
deliberately reconstructed from below, starting with the adjustment 
strategies of actors at the level of the business firm, and only then 
investigating the implications for regional and national labour 
institutions.  
 
Applying a conceptual framework which seeks to account for the 
complex interdependence between the micro-level of social action 
and macro-structural contexts, the paper draws upon institutional and 
regulationist views, and adopts an integrative approach which stresses 
the role of institutional structures in regularising and enabling social 
interaction. In doing so, this paper follows the ongoing cross-
disciplinary convergence in work dealing with institutionalisation and 
governance between branches of economics, such as institutional, 
post-Keynesian and post-Marxian economics, and the social sciences 
more generally (see DiMaggio, 1998; Hodgson, 1988; Hollingsworth 
and Boyer, 1997). What is referred to as ‘social turn’ within economic 
geography is another manifestation of this (see, for instance, Martin, 
1999; Storper, 1997; Thrift and Olds, 1996). 
 
Institutions constitute a crucial bridge between structure and strategy, 
and are understood here as systems of formal and informal rules and 
norms, brought about by, and at the same time influencing, socially 
habituated behaviour. The business firm and its stakeholders 
(manager’s, owner’s, worker’s, supplier’s, client’s etc.) are 
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relations at the micro-, meso- and macro-level. It is because of this 
that the metaphor ‘context’ was selected, accounting for the fact that 
the ‘fabric’ as a whole can only be understood as being continuously 
‘woven’ and ‘rewoven’ by individual and collective actors. From the 
perspective of the individual business firm this implies that the 
macro-institutional context is produced and reproduced by the 
interaction of individual and collective actors. At the same time, 
however, these structures (including both ‘hard’ political-economic 
institutions and ‘soft’ socio-cultural ones) are relatively ‘passive’ 
settings for agents, the contextual fabric of social structures both 
constraining and enabling individual action (see Berndt 1999). 
 
From this perspective labour markets may be conceptualised as 
realms in which individual and collective actors interact, giving rise to 
specific ‘power geometries’ (Massey, 1993) and to configurations of 
interrelated institutions (see Boyer, 1993). Three additional points 
have to be made here. First, the institutionalisation of labour relations 
is always place bound, regulatory forms varying in space as well as in 
time. This holds for local and regional labour markets, in particular, 
which constitute the spatial scale at which a sizeable part of labour is 
mobilised and reproduced (Peck, 1996, p. 11; Storper, 1995). At the 
same time the underlying social relations stretch across different 
spatial scales. There is therefore a need to investigate social processes 
across the spatial scale ‘hierarchy’, regulation and institutionalisation 
involving more than transformation or reproduction of social relations 
at a given spatial scale. For instance, the particular scale of a given 
firm’s crucial relations in-space may be grounded against political 
(e.g. the territorial nation-state or subnational entities), economic (e.g. 
the organisational reach of competitors; product markets) and social 
spaces (e.g. transnational communities; transregional or transnational 
coalitions of labour). In this context, the ability to control space and to 
surmount mobility barriers constitute crucial sources of power 
(Massey, 1993; Swyngedouw, 1997; Wills, 1996).  
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asymmetric distribution of power in social relations does not mean 
that actors are agencyless dupes. Rather, the research presented here 
started from the assumption that individual and collective actors 
always have some degree of transformative capacity. This includes 
the acknowledgement that workers actively shape their socio-spatial 
contexts, being able to produce their own history and geography 
(Herod, 1997; Martin et al., 1996).  
 
Finally, the approach chosen to reconstruct processes and events, that 
is, a ‘bottom-up’ perspective starting from the perspective of 
individual and collective interaction, does not mean that macro 
contexts can be neglected. This was done predominantly for analytical 
reasons, that is, approaching the issues in this way allowed me to 
better come to terms with what are very complex and multifaceted 
processes. Yet, while I continue to insist that an investigation like this 
has to take individual and collective actors seriously, this should by 
no means be understood as a strong ontological statement in the sense 
that one can neglect more far-reaching structures. However, following 
Layder (1997) I don’t believe in the still wide-spread micro-macro 
dualism, arguing instead that macro entities such as the nation-state 
cannot be seen independently from the individuals and groups 
producing, reproducing and transforming core institutions in daily 
action and interaction. Individual and collective actors may be 
confronted with challenges beyond their control, but in acting in order 
to reduce uncertainty and to adjust they reproduce and transform the 
‘system’, or they bring about new institutions. Given the focus in the 
German literature on the national level (see, for instance, the 
collection of papers in Cattero 1998 or in Streeck and Kluge 1999), I 
deliberately chose to represent events and interpretations of my 
interviewees in a discourse which moves up a heuristic scale 
hierarchy, that is the firm, the regional, the national and the 
international/transnational scale. In sum, this paper attempts to make 
sense of the re-regulation of German capital-labour relations by 
investigating social relations at the micro- and meso-level and asks 
how the geography of scales is changing as a result of this.  
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capital-labour relations are regulated and institutionalised in Germany 
(section 1), the empirical part of the paper starts with processes at the 
level of the individual business firm looking at changing practices of 
codetermination within the sample (section 2). Section 3 adopts a 
scale-by-scale approach, linking developments at the firm level with 
the (re)institutionalisation of collective bargaining. The paper closes 
by abstracting from empirical findings, discussing the complex 
relation between institutionalisation and geography, and speculating 
about the future of the German Model. 
 
2. The German Model: From ‘Co-operative Conflict Solution’ to 
Political-economy of Insecurity? 
 
Regulation theorists stress the inherently conflictual and contradictory 
nature of the distribution of accumulated capital. In order to guarantee 
a sufficiently stable and sustainable path of development these 
conflicts have to be regulated and governed. Recurring social 
relations give rise to specific institutional arrangements, mediating 
between collective interests and individual accumulation strategies. 
The social relations at the heart of this paper, capital-labour relations, 
are generally regarded as a crucial arena of this process.  
 
How can we define the exact configuration of the institutions which 
underpin capital-labour relations in Germany? There is an extended 
body of literature on the German Model and the specific ways in 
which capital-labour relations are regulated in Germany (see, for 
instance, Kern and Schumann, 1998; Streeck, 1993; Streeck, 1997). It 
should therefore suffice here to give only a very brief overview. The 
German Model
1 can generally be seen as a specific national 
compromise between state, civil society and economy, a compromise 
in principal being geared towards consensus and stability. 
Accordingly, firms are regarded as social institutions, not just 
networks of private contracts or the property of their shareholders, 
with corporate control being an ‘insider system’, that is, involving all 
stakeholders as opposed to the Anglo-American ‘outsider system’. 
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elaborate network of power relations which cushions the system 
against competitive pressures (Streeck, 1996, p. 12; Streeck, 1997). 
Here, two institutional configurations are crucial for this paper: 
collective bargaining and co-determination. 
 
Having its roots in the Rhine-Ruhr coal, iron and steel industry, the 
system of co-determination is legally enshrined in the 1972 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (BetrVG; Works Constitution Act). 
Workers in Germany are represented by works councils which are 
elected every four years. Works councils have legal rights to 
consultation and co-decision-making on a range of specified matters, 
their factual strength often exceeding their legal powers. Collective 
wage bargaining is conducted industry-wide, normally at the regional 
level. Here, it is the regional sections of both unions and employers 
associations which act as principal actors, with regional union bosses 
in particular exerting considerable power within the national union 
leaderships. Interestingly, labour unions have regularly pursued 
‘spatial’ strategies, normally selecting one of the more prosperous 
regions in southern Germany as so-called pilot regions. Once such a 
regional agreement is reached it is normally adopted by the remaining 
regions. 
 
With a view to the main organisational actors, the national union 
federation  Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB, German Trade 
Union Federation) and the Bundesvereinigung Deutscher 
Arbeitgeberverbände (BDA, Federal Association of German 
Employers Associations) represent labour and capital interests at the 
national level. With currently about 2.7 million members, it is IG 
Metall which is the crucial actor within the German labour movement. 
On the employer’s side IG Metall is matched by the BDA’s most 
powerful affiliate, Gesamtmetall. Both Gesamtmetall and IG Metall 
have an elaborate vertical organisational structure. National, regional 
and local branches coexist and fulfil different tasks within the 
institutionalised system of labour market regulation. 
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hostile, this finely articulated consensus has in recent years been 
subject to tremendous competitive pressure. Albeit with some time-
lag, above all in comparison to Anglo-American economies, the 
ongoing global restructuring process has, from the 1980s onwards, 
started to affect capital-labour relations, a process of dynamic change 
which has clearly accelerated during the 1990s (see Dörre, 1998; Kern 
and Sabel, 1994; Kern and Schumann, 1998; Müller-Jentsch, 1998). 
Generally, three familiar underlying processes can be identified: 
 
1. Changing patterns of employment and union membership: This 
concerns (i) the general trend away from manual to white-collar 
work, both within traditional manufacturing industries and in 
newer sectors, and (ii) the privatisation in recent years of strongly 
unionised public sectors (e.g. telecommunications, railway). 
2. Processes of globalisation: Greater mobility of capital, deregulation 
of hitherto protected domestic markets, or the general ideological 
drive for flexible labour markets, to mention only a few crucial 
dimensions of globalisation, have increasingly put pressure on the 
traditional corporatist compromise between state, labour and 
capital. 
3. A hostile domestic economic environment: Low economic growth, 
and high structural unemployment have caused serious problems 
for unions, in principle favouring capital vis-à-vis labour. 
 
In West Germany all this had profound repercussions for the 
traditional power geometry between capital and labour. Two general 
trends serve to illustrate this argument. First, this concerns structural 
unemployment which has steadily increased since 1970, regardless of 
cyclical up- or down-swings. Second, labour has seen a gradual 
erosion of its share of the national income, particularly from the early 
1980s onwards (Figure 1; for a more detailed picture of current labour 
market trends).  
 
It is important to note that the challenges posed by the neoliberal 
project have in Germany come to the fore with considerable time-lag 
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Britain. Here, the events following unification play a crucial role. For 
it was the euphoria and optimism, accompanied by the resurgence of 
nationalism, immediately after 1990 that contributed to a post-
unification economic boom. This boom sheltered the country from 
global market pressure and glossed over structural contradictions 
which many observers had already identified at the end of the 1980s. 
And after the country woke up to the realities, these contradictions 
came to the fore with even greater force. As a result, what may be 
regarded as a severe, but nevertheless cyclical economic downturn 
(the recession of 1993/1994) had wider implications. It marked the 
beginning of a period of considerable uncertainty and structural 
change in Germany, a period which at the time of writing has not 
come to an end. As an aside, this includes the fact that the state has in 
certain areas witnessed an erosion of its power to influence the course 
of developments (see, for instance Mahnkopf 1997, 225). 
Accordingly, the environment for German capital in general has been 
one of intensified competitive pressure during the 1990s, pressure 
which can, from the perspective of small and medium sized 
companies, be linked to the internationalisation strategies of large 
capital (see Berndt, 1998c). It is in this context that Beck (1998) 
hinted at a transition from ‘a political-economy of security to a 
political-economy of insecurity’. 
 
Based on these general observations, I will now look beyond the veil 
of aggregate data and seek to show how strategic adjustment on the 
part of firm stakeholders profoundly rearticulates the way in which 
capital-labour relations are governed in Germany. The following 
draws predominantly from research which investigated the adjustment 
strategies of selected small to medium-sized metal and engineering 
firms in the Ruhr Area (see Berndt, 1998a). The argument is 
additionally supported by more recent work which has been carried 
out within the wider Nürnberg labour market (Northern Bavaria), and 
by extensive analysis of secondary sources with regard to the 
strategies of key national players (e.g. national union leaders, national 
employers association representatives, government publications). The 
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not be understood in the sense of a celebration of individual 
differences. Rather, the aim of the research design was to find similar 
– not identical! – processes and trends by comparing individual cases, 
and in a further step to link these findings to the wider macro-context. 
Thus, although one clearly has to be cautious about generalising from 
the experience of SMEs in a traditional industrial region, I 
nevertheless seek to show that the empirical material presented in this 
paper allows conclusions that go beyond the narrow focus on a group 
of SMEs in the Ruhr Area. 
 
The methods used to sample the firms in the Ruhr Area, and to gather 
and analyse qualitative and quantitative data, are outlined elsewhere 
(see Berndt, 1998a). Here, space permits only a brief summary of the 
main points. The strategies of 28 small and medium sized firms were 
investigated for the period 1990 to 1996, immediately following 
unification, and included owners, managers and works councillors.
2 In 
addition to this, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
political decision-makers, unionists, representatives of employers 
associations and academics at the local, regional and national level.  
 
All firms belonged to the metals and electronics industry. Within this 
core industry specific focus was put on mechanical and electrical 
engineering, including both manufacturing and producer services. The 
latter were restricted to those firms which increasingly acted as 
general contractors due to organisational changes in the industry, and 
those which were involved in consulting work with a view to the 
introduction of new technology and production concepts. This focus 
on only a limited – albeit crucial – part of the German economy can 
be justified on two grounds. First, to the extent to which there is a 
German model of production, it has been the metals and electronics 
industry which constituted the main arena in which the core norms 
and rules of labour relations became institutionalised. Second and 
relatedly, stressing that there are mechanisms which ensure that 
developments in the core sectors diffuse to the rest of the economy is 
not to negate the fact that in a rising number of industries the role of 
  10traditional German corporatism is limited at best. And no doubt, too, 
that there is a specific geography to this, with the southern Länder 
(Bayern, Baden-Württemberg, Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz) in particular 
profiting from a ‘healthier’ sectoral mix. Yet, to make a trivial but 
necessary point, if one looks for answers to the question as to whether 
and how the German Model will be able to reinvent itself, these 
cannot be found in computer software or telecommunications, but 
within its core sectors. 
 
3. The Fragmented Firm: Segmentation and Coercion into Co-
operation 
 
As with German capital in general, the sample firms in the Ruhr Area 
during the study period (1990-1996) were confronted with 
governance dilemmas, that is with increasing uncertainty and stress, 
both in horizontal relations to competitors, and vertical ones to key 
customers or suppliers. 
 
Intra-firm divisions of labour have been deeply affected by these 
changes and processes, the firms responding with the reorganisation 
and restructuring of capital-labour relations. Notwithstanding 
individual differences, four related trends stand out: casualisation, 
intensification, ‘Japanisation’ and quantitative adjustment. Table 1 
gives an overview of the main developments underlying these 
processes.  
 
The mechanical engineering firm S.Kuhn
3 serves as an illustrative 
case-study. In response to a difficult competitive situation 
domestically and abroad, the owner-manager invested heavily in new 
machinery improving labour productivity considerably. Productivity 
increases were accompanied by two measures. First, in order to utilise 
capital investment better, S.Kuhn introduced an additional shift, 
employed additional skilled labour (that is, engineers or so-called 
Facharbeiter)
4 and increased output through intensification  of the 
labour process. This considerably improved the firm’s capacity to 
react quickly to demand fluctuations. Second, this in turn meant a 
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production facilities immediately after the interview, the owner-
manager demonstrated the new production line and pointed out that 
he needed only one worker to monitor the complex technology where 
five to six employees were required before. At the same time he 
increasingly switched to the employment of unskilled temporary 
workers (casualisation) and introduced quality circles for the 
remaining labour force (‘Japanisation’). 
 
In the same vein a majority of the interviewees reported a profound 
shake-up of workforces, pursuing a labour strategy which 
differentiated and segmented workforces alongside new lines and 
categories. For some workforce segments this translated into an 
erosion of established roles and positions within the firms and into a 
disembedding of traditional capital-labour relations. This 
casualisation process had two manifestations. The first concerns the 
increasing use of temporary work and the creation of a ‘new’ labour 
force segment. Companies used contingent labour to reduce 
uncertainty and cushion problems associated with the rapidly 
changing political-economic environment. Work contracted out in 
particular affected routine and less skilled activities. The owner-
manager of Gagsteiger summarised her strategic response as follows: 
 
"Well, first of all we of course no longer evened out natural 
fluctuation. Then, we had a relatively high number of temporary 
labour contracts, that is 12 or 18 months, which we have not 
prolonged. In 1993 we also had to revert to compensations. We 
tried to cut down those [employees] which were the least useful 
for the firm. Across the firm hierarchy, from top to bottom." 
(Owner-Manager, Gagsteiger, 11.10.95) 
 
The owner-manager of environmental engineer Böckler revealed a 
similar rationale:  
 
"From our perspective, I would say ... that we, to put it like this, 
don’t want millstone personnel around our neck. We say, we 
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money, but if we have a slump in demand, this would to a large 
extent be their problem."  
(Owner-Manager, Böckler, 30.11.95) 
 
Large-scale employment of temporary workers has been a relatively 
new phenomenon for the firms investigated (just as for the German 
economy as a whole; see below). What these quotes illustrate is the 
extent to which the hegemonic neoliberal representation of the 
German social economy (i.e. the discourse of overregulated and 
inflexible labour markets), filters down to the firm level and gets 
reproduced as owner-managers act according to this logic. The 
millstone metaphor, for instance, was used frequently by the 
interviewees.  
 
In doing so, and this is the second manifestation of casualisation, 
firms rigorously re-examined the positions and the ‘value’ of their 
different workforce segments. This involved changing positions in the 
firm hierarchy and a radical questioning of established practices ‘from 
top to bottom’ as the respondent above put it. Thus, owners and 
managers unsettled traditional institutional frameworks which are 
widely regarded as underpinning the high-skill, high productivity 
performance of the German production model. Crucially, the 
traditional institution of the industrial Meister
5 increasingly appears to 
be a thing of the past in the new production systems. Valuable 
insights in support of this view from the perspective of labour was 
provided by the head of the works council at Essen-based GKN-
GWB. At tradition-conscious GWB, which was taken over by the 
British GKN group in the late 1960s, recent reorganisation measures 
caused much upheaval. Talking about the introduction of new 
production concepts at the company and the impact this had on 
middle management, the interviewee commented: 
 
"You have to understand that when they were told that there 
would be no Meister anymore, a whole world broke down. I 
myself found it very unfortunate that they did this. I would have 
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and called them ‘Fachreferenten’ [= special expert], not Meister 
any longer. They had huge problems with this, they couldn’t 
quite see their future perspective ... My view is that this is a long-
term process. That workers learn to do things autonomously, this 
is a learning process, you can’t simply turn a switch ... this has to 
be learnt." 
(Head of Works Council, GKN-GWB, 26.09.95) 
 
Overall, institutions long taken for granted were becoming 
increasingly fragile within the firms. Personal identity and loyalty to 
the firm are being undermined as traditional material practices (e.g. 
technology and organisation of production), social relations, 
knowledge and ways of thinking are challenged by corporate 
decision-makers (see Schoenberger, 1997). All this resulted in a 
loosening of the traditional stable ties to the firm and increasing 
volatility in employer-employee relations at firm level. In addition to 
the relatively unskilled, this particularly affected middle management.  
 
It appears, however, that the construction of two apparently neat 
labour segments (skilled/useful vs. unskilled/useless) by the 
employers does not square with an increasingly complex reality. 
Workforces are increasingly becoming fragmented and differentiated, 
employers’ strategies giving rise to uncertainty and contradictions. 
Managers and/or owners were able to exploit the fragmentation and 
pushed for productivity coalitions at the level of the business firm. 
These coalitions have become known under the term Bündnis für 
Arbeit (alliance for employment). In these alliances labour and capital 
enter into formal contracts at firm level (so-called 
Betriebsvereinbarungen), exchanging concessions over labour costs 
for job security. These contracts are often outside the respective 
sectoral and regional collective bargaining contracts, and constitute a 
marked decentralisation of capital-labour relations. The head of the 
works council at the electrical engineering firm, Parsunke, for 
instance, referred to such an alliance at plant level, in which workers 
proposed to reduce working hours without financial compensation in 
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move by the ‘economic realities’ confronting the firm (Head of 
Works Council, Parsunke, 13.05.96). Similar pacts were reported by 
other firms. To further illustrate this point, asked about the 
relationship with the firm executive, the head of the works council at 
Morgott conceded that labour at the mining machinery firm was in a 
catch-22-position, a situation characterised by a juxtaposition of co-
operative and competitive elements. The interests of the employees 
had to be balanced with unpopular decisions in the face of an 
unfavourable market situation, making it necessary to ‘consent to a 
redundancy at times’ (Head of Works Council, Morgott, 13.05.96). 
This has to be seen in the context of a dire competitive situation and 
mismanagement, a crisis which eventually resulted in the death of the 
firm. 
 
Yet, it is necessary here to look at the different social dynamics 
underlying this development. Rather than the use of outright force, the 
overall situation may be better described as coercion versus 
persuasion into co-operation, depending on the degree of asymmetry 
in power relations. As regards weaker workforces or workforce 
segments, the norms and rules of interaction are simply redefined and 
transformed by the relatively stronger actor. On the other hand, there 
are situations in which workers may find that traditional ways to 
respond to a changing environment no longer fit either their situation 
at work or their life outside the domain of the firm. To put it 
differently, these workers have a vested interest in alliances with 
capital not only in order to keep jobs or to minimise job losses, but 
also to alter the rules and norms according to their own interest. This 
is linked to the wider societal transformation and a general 
revaluation of the work-leisure nexus. 
 
This illustrates that fragmentation and individualisation of labour 
relations may actually increase the power of some workers. Labour 
with valuable skills is often able to negotiate a better deal individually 
than in collective agreements struck between union and employers. 
Although it is service-oriented and engineering firms, in particular, 
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personalised, tacit and thus difficult to substitute, this pattern was 
found across the sample. Frequent complaints at a time of high 
unemployment across the sample that skilled personnel (i.e. 
Facharbeiter) were difficult to recruit further supports the labour 
market segmentation thesis. With the strategies portrayed above firms 
therefore also faced the risk of alienating the very workers they 
depended upon. 
 
These qualifications notwithstanding, the general pattern of capital-
labour relations at firm-level has been one of labour representatives 
increasingly appearing to make similar judgements concerning the 
necessary counter-measures in the wake of external pressure, sharing 
a similar world view with the management. The examples given 
above, however, serve as a reminder that there are many ways into co-
operation, ranging from fear of negative sanctions (that is, co-
operation brought about by outright force, coercion, authority etc.) to 
interest affinity allowing positive sanctions to work (persuasion, 
inducement). Stressing the self-evident fact that labour may have a 
vested interest in co-operation and a collectivist, positive-sum view of 
power is of course neither to say that capital produced through co-
operation (both economic and social) is always distributed evenly nor 
that we can neglect the question of how consensus is produced 
socially. 
 
The fact that the majority of firms reported profits during this difficult 
period shows that from a capital point of view, strategies to by-pass 
formal representation mechanisms appear to make sense, even if the 
price for short-term gains may of course be the loss of long-term 
competitiveness. From the point of view of fragmented labour, we 
have a potential mismatch between particular interests and collective 
ones, as weaker members of the workforces increasingly lack the 
resources of ‘voice’ and bear the brunt of the costs of restructuring.  
 
In sum, what we have here is a complex and gradual transformation of 
intra-firm relations, the rules of the game getting redefined and 
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unification is necessary. It would be futile from a perspective which 
stresses institutionalisation as a dynamic process to construct an ideal-
type before and after unification scenario. Just as there was never 
some kind of ‘golden age’ of codetermination – German labour 
continuously had to struggle and fight for codetermination, the 
reduction of the working week and so on - it would be equally wrong 
to sound the institution’s death knell.
6 What can be argued from the 
evidence presented so far is that the transformation in the way capital-
labour relations are regulated and governed at the firm level is a long-
term process which in recent years has assumed a new quality, in 
particular so within small and medium capital.
7  
 
4. The Geography of Labour Re-regulation: Redrawing of 
Boundaries, Downscaling and Exclusive Co-operation 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the developments outlined above are the 
result of quite different social processes, they combine in having 
repercussions for the geography of labour regulation in Germany. In 
what follows I argue (i) that these changes are about to ‘rework’ the 
wider ‘regulatory landscape’ (Hudson, 1996) in terms favourable to 
capital during a period in which the latter is in the ascendancy in the 
labour market, and (ii) that in order to understand the ongoing re-
regulation of capital-labour relations in Germany one has to look at 
the peculiar spatial dimension of this process.  
 
4.1. Exclusive intra-firm alliances and the declining power of 
regional labour market intermediaries  
 
At the level of the individual business firm the production of 
consensus, be it by coercion into co-operation or resulting from more 
active interests of labour, clearly aimed at a hostile outside world. In 
the words of the owner-manager of Meck: 
 
"One declares one’s solidarity with each other. One has enemies 
outside, this concerns direct competition and certainly also 
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competition from abroad." 
(Owner-Manager, Meck, 18.09.95) 
 
Actors look for stability and certainty in the face of competitive 
pressure, resulting in efforts to distinguish themselves from outsiders 
and a contradictory pattern of intra-firm inclusion and extra-firm 
exclusion. Left behind by the various attempts to fend off "the enemy 
outside" are those who are pushed from insider to outsider positions, 
that is into casual, insecure employment or into unemployment. By 
drawing increasingly on temporary agencies or on pools of contract 
workers as buffers at times of demand volatility, firms socialise the 
costs of labour flexibility. This view was supported by the interviewee 
at the Ruhr IGM headquarters (Senior Official, IG Metall Bezirk 
Dortmund, 07.05.96). Numbers for West Germany and for Nordrhein-
Westfalen, the Land in which the Ruhr Area is situated, show that 
since 1976 temporary work has risen sharply, particularly in recent 
years (Figure 2). 
 
What does this mean for collective wage bargaining in the region? 
Both sides of the collective bargaining partnership, the employers’ 
associations and the labour unions, have seen a continuous erosion of 
their power. To start with the employers side, regional capital 
representatives have come under increasing pressure from individual 
firms accusing them of being too lenient with the labour unions. An 
important catalyst in this context was, in 1995, a controversial wage 
deal struck in the Bavarian metals and electronics industry. The 
Bavarian pilot wage deal, which other regional Gesamtmetall 
affiliates adopted only after acrimonious discussions, was generally 
regarded as favouring larger companies.  
 
Hence, after the responsible wage bargaining commission 
(Tarifkommission) at the NRW employers’ association decided to 
accept the deal, there were major conflicts between small and large 
firm representatives, culminating in formal and informal forms of 
resistance. The former strategy involved resignations and defections 
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8, a move 
which in principle means that wage negotiations have to be conducted 
at plant level. The latter, more frequently used strategy of resistance 
has been a conscious breach of the agreement, companies simply not 
implementing wage increases and other agreed measures (Official, 
Verband der Metall- und Elektroindustrie NRW, 30.04.96). The 
owner-manager of Reinhold, for instance, said regarding the 
employers’ performance: 
 
"They were absolutely too soft. There have been many defections 
because of this, above all by the industrial small and medium-
sized firms, which did not agree to these contracts, which would 
have rather been prepared to fight a strike." 
(Owner-Manager, Reinhold, 06.11.95) 
 
Evidence from the 16 case-study firms which were members of the 
employers’ association at the time of interviewing
9 further supports 
the conclusion that industrial relations in Germany are becoming 
increasingly decentralised. While outright defection has not occurred 
in the sample, we have already seen that firms have struck special 
agreements with the workforce, owners and managers in part being 
able to coerce workers into co-operation in the face of ‘economic 
realities’. In other words, the growing number of firm-level alliances 
for employment mentioned earlier has to be seen as direct strategic 
response to the 1995 wage round. 
 
As major rifts surfaced amongst employers across the country, 
regional employers’ associations were put under pressure to adopt a 
more confrontational attitude. This also affected employers in 
traditionally more consensus-oriented Nordrhein-Westfalen and the 
Ruhr Area, as the interviewee at the regional employers headquarters 
in Düsseldorf confirmed (Official, Verband der Metall- und 
Elektroindustrie NRW, 30.04.96). That this development would 
clearly not be in the interest of the regional IG Metall was illustrated 
by the respondent at the Ruhr Area IG Metall headquarters: 
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not at all keen on having weak employers’ associations. This is 
because we would of course lose our negotiation partner and 
because agreements which we strike in negotiations are [then] 
extremely difficult to implement. A horrible situation for us. But 
we have said to ourselves, ‘if there is no other way we simply 
have to go from plant to plant’." 
(Senior Official, IG Metall Bezirk Dortmund, 07.05.96) 
 
Strikingly, this shows how the traditional corporatist actors are locked 
together, each party’s power position being inextricably linked to the 
legitimisation of the other. This results in a common interest to defend 
the traditional wage bargaining system and resistance to change. 
Overall, pressure from below, most notably from small and medium 
firms, played an important role in changing the attitude of employers 
representatives. 
 
Pressure stemming from the actions of the ‘represented’ also built up 
in the labour unions. Again, the firm-level alliances for employment 
played a crucial part, given that in these contracts individual works 
council members are increasingly in conflict with the official union 
line. The owner-manager at the metal goods producer Schraml, for 
instance, mentioned special agreements with the workforce and 
commented: 
 
"This had to do with the flexibilisation of working time. We think 
that there remains much to be done with regard to direct labour 
costs and you can’t find anything on this issue in [the collective 
wage agreements] for Nordrhein-Westfalen. We try to reach 
special agreements [with the workforce]." 
(Owner-Manager, Schraml, 26.10.95) 
 
A note of caution is appropriate here. The widespread view to the 
contrary notwithstanding, collective wage agreements in Germany 
have in recent years significantly widened the scope for flexible time 
management. Like the interviewee cited above, employers in general 
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are faced here with a collective reinterpretation and negation of the 
facts which serves as a justification to ‘go informal’. The fact that 
labour representatives within the firm go along with this demonstrates 
the extent to which the power geometry within the firms has changed 
and unions have been silenced. 
 
More generally, the weakening of IG Metall’s position is linked to 
additional factors. Crucially, there has been a significant drop in 
membership in recent years. At the local level IG Metall saw its 
membership in Gelsenkirchen, a Ruhr city in which 14 sample firms 
are located, decline from about 18,000 in the early 1980s to just over 
15,000 in 1990 and 13,000 in 1996 (Senior Official, IG Metall 
Gelsenkirchen, 10.06.96). While much of this reduction is commonly 
attributed to a growing dissatisfaction amongst workers, it is in fact a 
result of more complex processes. Undoubtedly, the significant 
reduction of employment in traditional manufacturing industries plays 
the major role. The decline was further exacerbated by reorganisation 
measures, that is, the trend towards outsourcing and disintegration. As 
a result, many now independent or quasi-independent units no longer 
fall under the jurisdiction of IG Metall, belonging instead to less 
tightly regulated service sectors. As pointed out earlier, it is important 
to note that this also affects labour at large firms. What is striking is 
that, once unemployed, most members appear to decide to leave the 
labour union (Senior Official, IG Metall Gelsenkirchen, 10.06.96). 
Since membership fees are linked to income and membership is not 
dependent on permanent employment, the fact that so many workers 
opt for exit suggests a crisis of representation, workers apparently 
feeling that their interests are not adequately represented once they are 
made redundant.  
 
Consequently, faced with the pressures outlined earlier and with the 
fear of redundancy, the IG Metall works councillors, like the 
individual employers, exerted pressure on their representatives to 
change their negotiation positions. In contrast to the employers, 
however, IG Metall was forced to adopt a more conciliatory policy. 
  21These changes are a reflection of the shifting power geometry 
between capital and labour. But these processes do not stop at the 
local or regional level, I will now turn to national, inter-regional 
dimensions of the transformation process. 
 
4.2. "You can’t get people on Sundays": unification and the East 
as laboratory for ‘flexible’ regulation  
 
The plant engineering firm Fähmel is an interesting example of the 
extent to which unification influenced developments in the Ruhr 
Area. This successful firm acquired production facilities in East 
Germany in October 1990 and has continuously expanded its 
workforce there. More recently, a modest decline of the Ruhr 
workforce during the period 1996 to 1998 was accompanied by an 
increase from 35 to 41 in the East during the same period. At the time 
of interviewing, the owner-manager mentioned internal competition 
from the production site in the East, hinting at lower wages (at the 
time of interviewing 85% of the West German equivalent) and a 
longer working week (40 instead of 35 hours). He regarded these 
conditions as competitive advantages and argued that workers in the 
East: 
 
"... have got a completely different degree of motivation, the 
people have a need to make up. This is different [in the Ruhr 
Area]. Here leisure time counts as much [as time at work], you 
can’t get people on Sundays. The next step is, if we could decide 
this again, we would move 100 km further [east]." 
(Owner-Manager, Fähmel, 23.11.95) 
 
There is an emerging division of tasks between regional production 
systems such as the Ruhr Area and those in the new Länder or Eastern 
Europe, eight sample firms having established subsidiaries in the 
former, three in the latter. West German firms in general very quickly 
relocated production to Eastern Germany and used the East as 
laboratory for labour conditions and production methods which would 
have been resisted in the west. Accordingly, as smaller firms suddenly 
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domestic level, this fed back to the old Länder. For instance, while 
65.3% of West German employees across industries are covered by 
collective wage agreements, this holds only for 43.9% in the East 
(numbers for 1997; source: Bispinck, 1999, p. 82). 
 
The mass exit of existing, and the refusal of new, firms to join forced 
employers associations in the East to revert to voice, Gesamtmetall in 
1993 being the first association to terminate a collective bargaining 
agreement without giving notice (Müller-Jentsch, 1998, p. 147). This 
conscious breach of rules by the employers constituted a clear sign of 
the changing situation. What is important in this context is that many 
firms would only be able to make the move to the east with high 
financial and social costs. Those firms instead actively used this 
option as a threat to discipline their local workforces. This qualifies 
some of the statements made by the interviewees and sheds light on 
the extent to which labour has been weakened. Overall, for many 
regional production systems in the West, unification therefore meant a 
profound change of the position in the inter-regional division of 
labour.  
 
The crisis of representation within NRW and Ruhr intermediaries 
outlined above is thus symptomatic for problems nation-wide. The 
organisation rate in the metal and electronics industry, decreasing 
only slightly by 2 percentage points from 1964 to 1984, has 
subsequently fallen from 74.4% in 1984 to 64.3% in 1997 (Schroeder 
and Ruppert cited in Heinze, 1998, p. 135; Gesamtmetall 1999). 
Recent membership trends illustrate that this decline has accelerated 
since the mid 1980s (see Table 2). Similarly, between 1991 and 1997 
the DGB lost almost 3.2 million members or about 27% of its 
membership base, IG Metall suffering an equally dramatic decline of 
almost 1 million (26.5%; sources: Statistical Yearbook of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, various volumes). Although this decline has to 
be seen in connection with an inflated membership size in the wake of 
unification, it has profound consequences, not least with regard to 
union finances. 
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proposed a national alliance for employment plan in November 1995. 
Originally, this proposal aimed at a national level contract between 
labour unions, employers associations and the state and as such 
effectively at the restoration of the power of the collective bargaining 
institutions in the face of the erosion portrayed earlier (for a detailed 
account of this, see Bispinck, 1996).  
 
Within the employers camp, this proposal caused friction and 
revealed conflicts of interest. Put simply, the BDA cautiously 
welcomed the idea of a national-level alliance for employment. This 
is not surprising if one recalls the fact that the BDA has a vested 
interest in maintaining the collective bargaining mechanism. 
Industrial pressure groups and sectoral business associations
10 (e.g. 
the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, BDI), however, clearly 
campaigned for an overhaul and shake-up of the traditional system. It 
was because of the pressure from individual firms and their sectoral 
interest groups that Gesamtmetall, the metal employers’ association, 
rejected this ambitious plan, advocating instead a more decentralised 
and flexible system, a move justified with expected positive 
employment effects (see Hundt, 1996). 
 
As the experience of the sample firms and general trends in NRW and 
the Ruhr Area after the collapse of national talks illustrate, the firms 
appear to have got their way. The Gelsenkirchen IGM representative 
confirmed the decentralisation of industrial relations, arguing that 
after the failure of the alliance for employment at the national level 
unions were forced to seek regional and local deals (Senior Official, 
IG Metall Gelsenkirchen, 10.06.96). Again, this further trend towards 
flexibilisation and decentralisation of wage bargaining was not solely 
due to the employers. Parts of the labour union movement appear to 
have changed their attitude as well. Strikingly, the apparently 
traditionalist Ruhr and NRW IG Metall played an active role in this 
strategic repositioning, as indicated by the interviewee at IGM 
Gelsenkirchen, who commented on the future of collective wage 
bargaining: 
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different areas. The labour unions are not always the ones which 
have to be pushed, we accept the need for change. Besides, our 
members demand this ... The metal industry is extremely 
differentiated. One could envisage introducing ... options for 
single sectors and regions ..." 
(Senior Official, IG Metall Gelsenkirchen, 10.06.96) 
 
At the regional level, the former leader of the Dortmund District and 
current head of the NRW IG Metall, Harald Schartau, has in recent 
years acquired a reputation as a reformer within the national IGM 
executive, arguing in favour of – controlled – decentralisation and 
flexibilisation (see Schartau, 1995; Zeit, 18.4.97). In sum, there are 
conflicts and tensions between traditionalists and modernisers at all 
levels, and IG Metall is undergoing a period of decisive change.
11 
 
Gradual as they may be, these changes in the national and regional 
regulatory landscape further aggravate the impact of individual firm 
strategies on vulnerable segments of the labour force. As a result, 
there appears to be a shift from a dual to a ‘triadic’ labour market, 
with a very mobile global elite (the actors making up global expert 
systems, for instance, managers in transnational firms), a more or less 
regionally bound group of producers of goods and services in secure 
employment (including both capital owners, for instance in small 
firms, and labour) and, finally, those who are marginalised either 
suffering from unemployment or only able to find casual 
employment. Ruhr and German labour market trends support this 
assumption. A closer look at the recent development and composition 
of temporary employment, reveals that this particularly affects 
unskilled manual workers, in Germany and in NRW in particular. 
With a view to the whole economy, temporary workers throughout the 
skill categories have since 1980 seen their share of average monthly 
income being significantly eroded. And, what is more, there is a 
striking gender dimension to this, the male share of temporary labour 
during the period 1976 to 1995 increasing from 68.9 to 80.8% 
(compare Figure 3 and Tables 3 and 4). A similar pattern holds for the 
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Area, NRW and Germany. Overall, the long-term unemployed, older 
workers and ‘Gastarbeiter’ fared particularly badly (see Berndt 
1998a). 
 
What is important in this context is that in addition to having seen 
much legal protection removed by the state, marginalised workers in 
addition lack adequate institutionalised representation of their 
interests. The increasing number of union members made redundant 
who resigned their membership testifies to the fact that, for the 
unemployed, unions such as IG Metall are not regarded as 
representing their interests. After all, with their emphasis on striking 
contracts with employers the unions primarily aim at securing existing 
employment, but do little to improve the position of people out of 
work. Consequently, there has been a response by alternative social 
movements, which for instance formed the Bundesarbeitsgruppen der 
Initiativen gegen Arbeitslosigkeit und Armut (federations of initiatives 
against unemployment and poverty; BAG-Erwerbslose). Arguing that 
people without jobs are regularly bypassed and have no voice, 
criticism is in addition to the state and capital also directed towards 
the official unions (BAG-Erwerbslose, 1996). While neglect of 
marginalised workers by labour unions in corporatism is not a new 
phenomenon (for an earlier critique, see Offe and Hinrichs, 1977), 
their recent rise in absolute numbers and the simultaneous cuts into 
the national welfare system by the government clearly makes the 
representation issue a particularly critical one today.  
 
4.3. Defensive resistance against globalisation: societal contracts 
in the name of competitiveness 
 
Finally, from an international perspective, the national alliance for 
employment proposal was seen by the traditional corporatist actors as 
a device to respond to the challenges of globalisation. The IG Metall 
leader linked his proposal to international competitive pressure on 
working conditions and labour regulation in Germany, seeking a 
national societal contract against globalisation (see Altvater and 
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representatives explicitly based their strategic efforts on territorialised 
resistance within national ‘container’ space.  
 
This attitude is in stark contrast to the one in the employers camp. The 
president of the BDA, for instance, pointedly refers to an ‘alliance for 
employment and competitiveness’ (Hundt, 1998; my emphasis). 
Consequently, the various groups representing the interests of capital 
have exerted pressure on the Federal Government to adopt regulatory 
changes which aim at a US- and UK-style ‘flexibilisation’ of the 
labour market. These policy changes were seen as essential in the 
light of international competitive pressure and global integration (for 
instance, see Henkel, 1997) 
 
The Kohl Government always regarded the alliance for employment 
as a programme for employment and growth (see Federal Government 
of Germany, 1996). After the collapse of the alliance for employment 
at the national level, the Conservative-Liberal Federal Government 
implemented first steps in this direction. In September 1996 the 
Government majority in the Bundestag finally passed the so-called 
Wachstums- und Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz (Law for the 
Promotion of Growth and Employment) which in addition to cuts in 
the social insurance system (e.g. an increased female retirement age, 
cuts in health care) included three laws directly related to labour 
market regulation. The first reduced the legal sick pay requirement 
from 100 to 80 per cent of the nominal wage. Secondly, the rules 
governing temporary work were further relaxed, especially for newly 
established small firms. Thirdly, from October 1997 the threshold at 
which employees enjoy legal protection against dismissal 
(Kündigungsschutz) was raised from firms with five to those with ten 
employees. The proportion of companies excluded from this 
regulation thus increased from 67 to 83 per cent and the numbers of 
employees from 6.8m (24% of total employment) to 8.4m (30%) 
(source: Süddeutsche Zeitung 8.6.96), with profound implications for 
the labour market. Federal Government deregulation was mainly 
directed at enabling numerical flexibilisation strategies and at 
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logic put forward by business interests, further contributing to the 
shift in the power geometry between labour and capital. Again, those 
workers on the ‘long side’ of the labour market are particularly 
disadvantaged.  
 
The role of the state is obviously a complex and an ambiguous one. 
While austerity policies and decisions to ‘renovate’ the German 
welfare system, as it is euphemistically put, contribute to an erosion 
of the state’s regulatory capacities, the state at the same time reasserts 
itself, for instance, all but abolishing the right for asylum and limiting 
immigration. As an aside, recent events illustrate that there are only 
small differences between the new ‘centre-left’ and the old, 
conservative-liberal government in this regard (compare the current 
problems regarding the ‘new’ national alliance for employment, 
asylum and ‘immigration’ policy, or tax policy). Yet, both 
contradictory trends are two sides of the same coin. The state needs to 
make up for sovereignty lost to mobile (large) capital, both by 
tightening its grip over those ‘insiders’ who are relatively less mobile 
(e.g. domestic workers, small firms) and by reducing the freedom of 
movement of undesired ‘outsiders’. All these dilemmas testify to the 
increasing difficulties in maintaining a ‘territorial container’ in the 
context of globalisation, and in my view are far too complex to be 
reduced to either simple ‘death of the nation-state’ theses or routine 
evocations of a continuing salience of the national level. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks: ‘Spatial Incongruence’, 
Institutionalisation and the Future of the German Model 
 
The task now is to combine the points raised above and to make sense 
of the ongoing re-regulation process. Here, the link between 
institutionalisation and space deserves more scrutiny. The main 
argument so far is that re-regulation of capital-labour relations in 
Germany can be interpreted as the result of individual and collective 
action in response to ‘external’ pressure. Adjustment strategies 
redefined and rearticulated core institutions of the German Model, or - 
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create trust and tie actors together. The ambivalent nature of 
institutions (labour market institutions as well as the state) means that 
they help to define both a sense of ‘togetherness’ and identity as well 
as ‘outsider images of the other’, drawing and redrawing boundaries 
(material-territorial, social or cognitive) between insiders and 
outsiders (Newman and Paasi, 1998, p. 196). It is exactly this dialectic 
which helps us to understand the Janus-faced nature of globalisation, 
a diminishing importance of boundaries and territorialisation on the 
one hand, and a simultaneous reassertion of difference, the production 
of new boundaries on the other. Boundaries conceptualised in this 
way are at the same time the product and the symbol of power 
relations and processes of institutionalisation.  
 
With a view to the business firm and capital-labour relations, the 
question of who acquires insider and outsider status assumes a new 
quality at times of increasing global competition. Who belongs to the 
firm? Who is covered by collective bargaining agreements? Who 
profits from re-regulation? And who loses out? By laying off 
segments of the regular workforce, by hiring temporary labour or by 
restructuring the labour force qualitatively, decision-makers 
constantly draw and redraw boundaries, and in doing so loosen and 
strengthen personal ties. Evidence from the Ruhr Area, but also from 
other regional contexts illustrates that these processes clearly have 
profound repercussions for everyday life and consequently for the 
way spatial representations of the ‘region’ are constituted socially and 
culturally (see, for instance, the collection of essays in Kreibich et al., 
1994). 
 
The marginalised and the forgotten losers of these processes are the 
relatively ‘unskilled’, the unemployed, people who are permanently 
or temporarily excluded from the labour market.  
 
In this vein, one could conceptualise institutionalisation as a finely 
articulated compromise between inclusion and exclusion, a power 
compromise which is linked to mobility differences and to the 
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Some of the spatial scale contexts produced by these 
institutionalisation processes are territorially ‘fixed’ (e.g. the nation-
state), others are more porous, for instance corporate organisational 
spaces or spaces produced by movements of people or ideas. All of 
them are, however, deeply intertwined with each other. 
 
We have seen that the re-regulation of capital-labour relations in 
Germany stretches across different socio-spatial scales of interaction 
(for an illustrative summary, see Figure 4). From a more abstract 
perspective, the spatial reach of actions differs increasingly in the 
wake of globalisation, unsettling a distinct and historically evolved 
national regulatory compromise. The emerging ‘new’ power 
geometry is linked to different abilities to move in-space, to control 
organisational space and to surmount mobility barriers. While firms, 
above all large companies, increase their organisational reach and 
create new economic spaces which go beyond the territory of the 
nation-state, place-bound and more immobile actors desperately look 
for ways to stem the tide. In this context, concerted efforts between 
capital, labour and the state, be it the national alliance for employment 
or firm-level productivity coalitions, are too often confined to the 
formation of defensive coalitions, seeking to protect and conserve 
traditional benefits. 
 
Power resources of certain individual or collective actors are more 
place dependent, and as such more difficult to substitute than those of 
others (see Cox, 1996; Storper, 1997). As the spatial reach of 
decisions and activities differs increasingly in the wake of 
globalisation, this ‘spatial incongruence’ disadvantages those actors 
whose social relations make them more place dependent. In this 
context, the case-studies show that it is often enough to rhetorically 
invoke the threat of movement in order to enforce concessions in-situ. 
The organisational capacity to control space allows dominant actors to 
impose social practices, norms and rules at a particular spatial scale 
(Swyngedouw, 1997, pp. 146-147). All this is however neither a 
simple question of large firm dominance over small firms, or capital’s 
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extent to which actors in seemingly similar positions may react 
differently to institutional ‘constraints’ and shifting power relations.  
 
However, boundaries erected in defence – be they material, social or 
cognitive – have ambivalent effects. In helping to create collective 
identities, and as such exerting a co-operative impulse (always 
acknowledging the different ways in which power sources are used to 
that effect!), they may facilitate adjustment. At the same time 
boundaries shield actors, obstruct interaction and exchange with the 
‘outside world’, and may as such block from view alternative ways of 
dealing with new challenges. 
 
In the face of this, what future is there for co-determination and 
collective bargaining in Germany? Is Germany simply catching up 
with the Anglo-American example, entering a completely new 
institutional trajectory? Although there are differences in opinion 
between optimists and pessimists, observers generally agree that the 
situation in Germany cannot be compared to the one in the UK or in 
the US (see Dörre, 1998; Kern and Sabel, 1994; Müller-Jentsch, 
1998). Capital-labour relations in Germany will continue to be 
regulated by distinct institutional compromises. It is important here to 
point at the still considerable strength of the labour movement and to 
the fact that the situation is more stable within large firms. Moreover, 
the regionalised nature of the ‘German Model’, and a general mistrust 
against the neoliberal market dogma further mitigate against full 
convergence. On the other hand, the case-studies show that the 
German Model of industrial relations is clearly under pressure to 
adjust and the rules of the game have in my view already been 
‘reworked’ considerably. This concerns above all the rescaling of 
labour regulation. The simultaneous decentralisation and 
individualisation (i.e. personalisation) of the rules and norms 
governing codetermination and collective bargaining in Germany 
have enabled capital to adjust to the requirements imposed by a world 
of free markets and competition. Ironically, and paradoxically in the 
light of the developments outlined above, codetermination has thus 
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competitiveness of German capital, at a time when many employers 
appear to believe they could dispense with institutionalised 
representation.  
 
At the time of writing it is not at all clear codetermination and 
collective bargaining will look like in the future. What changes and 
adjustment will be necessary to enable these institutions to survive in 
an increasingly hostile context? And will the ‘result’ still justify the 
label codetermination and collective bargaining (without pretending 
the existence of a somehow ‘golden scenario’ in the past)? Optimists 
like Müller-Jentsch (1998, p. 152) appear to envisage a ‘flexible 
three-tier system of governance’, where (i) labour unions and 
employers associations will continue to negotiate and agree upon 
sectoral framework agreements, with regional wage bargaining 
continuing to play an important role; (ii) detailed regulation of pay 
and working conditions will increasingly be negotiated at the 
individual firm level, the legal framework underpinning co-
determination being changed accordingly; and (iii) this may be 
accompanied by more direct participation, for instance through team 
work, for workers in day-to-day affairs. Whatever the outcome, any 
new configuration will be the result of negotiation and mediation 
between individual and collective actors, with the degree of 
asymmetry in underlying power relations playing a crucial role. This 
scenario would leave it mainly to the unions to resist potentially 
regressive policies which appear to aggravate the spatial incongruence 
between regulation and accumulation, by scaling down the geography 
of labour institutions to the level of the business firm, creating an 
‘intra-firm welfare state’ to borrow a phrase coined by Esping-
Andersen (1992, p. 145; see Figure 4). The extent to which IG Metall 
and other unions will continue to play a progressive role in the 
coordination of capital-labour relations will, however, depend on their 
ability to change their policies. We have seen that unions and worker 
representatives applied their considerable power predominantly in a 
defensive and exclusive manner, at all scale levels, be it the firm, the 
region or the nation-state. As such labour representatives routinely 
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institutionalised throughout the successful post-war era. 
 
In their efforts to counter this downscaling process, union 
representatives must however look beyond defensive protection solely 
based on national or regional affiliation and beyond exclusionary 
policies serving only the narrow interests of those already in 
employment. Interregional and international co-operation of labour 
representatives plays a crucial role here. And there is evidence for a 
rethinking. German unionists in 1997 institutionalised annual 
meetings with colleagues in neighbouring Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxembourg, aiming at countering the spatial arbitrage strategies on 
the part of capital. Interestingly, while the remaining single union 
delegates at the last meeting on 4-5 September 1998 were affiliated 
with the respective national headquarters, the IG Metall was 
represented by their regional NRW leader Schartau. This illustrates 
the crucial role of the NRW branch in initiating the co-operation 
(source: DGB 1998). Even earlier - in 1995 - a similar scheme was 
established between the Bavarian IG Metall and colleagues from the 
Czech metal union KOVO (Süddeutsche Zeitung 11.8.98). And at the 
level of larger companies, there is an increasing role of European 
works councils, not so much for direct representation and 
involvement, but as facilitators and mediators of informal 
transnational contacts and networks. To close with a quote from the 
German DGB leader Schulte (1998; my translation): 
 
"The overcoming of national traditions should become the 
guiding line of our European strategy. In ‘Euroland’ we will 
otherwise no longer have the power to influence things, let alone 
the power to resist.”  
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1.  The ‘German Model’ should be seen as an ideal-type 
construction, a heuristic device rather than a concrete, 
observable fact. This conceptualisation acknowledges that there 
may be many ‘production models’ in Germany (see Herrigel, 
1996), and has been another reason for choosing an approach 
which links adjustment strategies across socio-spatial scales, 
seeing corporate actors as being embedded in a complex web of 
social relations in different contexts. 
 
2.  At the firm level, interviews were conducted with owner-
managers, general managers, human resources managers and 
works councillors depending on the size of the business in 
question, and whether employees had set up a works council. 
Semi-structured interviews centred on two broad ‘recurring 
relations’: (i) inter-firm relations (vertical: suppliers, customers; 
horizontal: competitors, including the role of associations) and 
(ii) intra-firm relations. Special emphasis was put on how 
changes in both sets of crucial relations were interrelated and 
implicated in each other. The evidence presented by the 
interviewees was where possible ‘double-checked’. Statements, 
for instance, made by employers were balanced against the 
statistical data available for my firms, checked with works 
councillors from the same firms and – most importantly – with 
the respective local union representative who normally has a 
good knowledge of what is going on in ‘his/her’ firms. 
 
3.  The names of the small and medium firms have been altered. 
 
4.  After successfully completing their apprenticeship or after 
having gained several years of practical experience, employees 
in industry and manufacturing normally receive a certificate 
giving them the status of a Facharbeiter (lit. specialist worker). 
Facharbeiter are a product of the ‘dual system’ and as such 
embody its unique combination of theoretical knowledge and 
  34practical experience, giving them a pivotal role as experts on the 
shopfloor. 
 
5.  Originating from the Latin word Magister, the Meister (master) 
title constitutes the final step of a traditional professional career 
in the craft sector and in industry. With regard to the latter, 
employees are required to hold a Facharbeiter certificate, have 
an additional period of practical experience, participate in 
further theoretical education (usually several years) and to 
successfully pass an examination held by the local chamber of 
industry and commerce. Meister traditionally make up the ranks 
of middle management supervising and organising workers on 
the shopfloor, and generally display strong professional ethos 
and pride. 
 
6.  I am indebted to an anonymous referee for alerting me to this 
point. 
 
7.  The development of the share of workers formally represented 
by works councils at the national level supports this view. While 
during the period 1981 to 1990 this share decreased from 50.6% 
to 45.4% (numbers for West Germany), in 1998 less than 36% 
of employees worked in firms with works councils (Spiegel 
1998, 78). As an aside, while the codetermination system is 
certainly more stable within large capital, there is evidence for 
‘institutional erosion’ as well. Factors here are the shift away 
from the most far-reaching type of codetermination 
(Montanmitbestimmung) in the wake of the recent merger of 
Thyssen and Krupp, or the massive reorganisation currently 
underway more generally involving the outsourcing of activities 
and the formation of smaller units, on the one hand, and a 
‘tertiarisation’ process with obvious consequences for the 
regulation of capital-labour relations, on the other. 
 
8.  It is extremely difficult to gather reliable data on this issue, 
above all with a view to regional variation. With regard to 
  35NRW, it was not possible to retrieve statistical data from the 
regional employers’ association. 
 
9.  Note that to this number one has to add those firms which do not 
formerly belong to any employers association, but have signed 
so-called  Anerkennungstarifverträge. These concern formal 
contracts over the recognition of collective wage agreements 
with the unions, the firms committing themselves regularly to 
recognise and implement the result of the collective wage 
negotiations. Five sample firms reported this practice. 
 
10.  It is important to distinguish between employers associations 
and business associations. The latter are classical lobbying 
groups, while the former represent firms in wage negotiations. 
 
11.  This includes increasing competition between single unions as a 
result of the changing nature of employment. In Nürnberg 
(Northern Bavaria), for instance, the white collar union DAG 
and IGM have been embroiled in a bitter dispute to organise 
labour at a local Lucent subsidiary in order to get a foot into the 
telecommunications and media sector. Given that there has 
traditionally been a tacit ‘non-aggression pact’ between different 
single unions, this shows the extent to which labour institutions 
are changing in Germany. Arguing for a consensual solution, the 
respondent at the Nürnberg IGM headquarters said: "We need a 
contractual solution [at Lucent]; without this there will be 
war.” (Official, IG Metall Nürnberg, 1.12.98).  
 
  36Table 1: The labour strategies of the 28 sample firms, 1990 to 1995 
 
Strategy Measures 
Temporary workers in production; contingent labour as 
buffers; increasing reliance on contract workers 
Temporaries in administration 
Casualisation/contingent labour (23 
firms) 
Using subsidised labour 
Intensification (13 firms)  Acceleration of turnover time through mechanisation 
New production concepts 
('Japanisation') (13 firms) 
Quality circles, team-work, reorganisation  
De-hierarchisation 
Quantitative adjustment/ numerical 
flexibility (13 firms) 
'Downsizing'; overall reduction of the workforce 
Bonuses, performance-related wages 
Individual contracts 
Individualisation (6 firms) 





Table 2: Organisation rates within the metal and electronics industry, West 
Germany 
 
  Percentage share of all firms  Percentage share of all employees 
1980  57.4 72.7 
1985  54.6 73.8 
1990  46.4 69.4 
1994  43.1 64.9 
1997
1  35.2 64.3 
 
1 preliminary figures. 
 
Sources: Müller-Jentsch, 1998, page 145; Gesamtmetall 1999; own calculations. 
 Table 3: Structure of temporary labour in West Germany, 1976-1995 
 




Male Female Percentage   
share male 
1976  16858 0.08  11618  5240  68.9 
1977  21186 0.11  14952  6234  70.6 
1978  26408 0.13  18625  7783  70.5 
1979  36318 0.18  26712  9606  73.6 
1980  47021 0.22  34819  12202  74.0 
1981  43058 0.21  31921  11137  74.1 
1982  29117 0.14  19280  9837  66.2 
1983  25702 0.13  17582  8120  68.4 
1984  32976 0.16  23652  9324  71.7 
1985  48707 0.24  36731  11976  75.4 
1986  70376 0.34  56059  14317  79.7 
1987  73083 0.35  58427  14656  79.9 
1988  87743 0.41  71380  16363  81.4 
1989  104930 0.49  85761  19169  81.7 
1990  123378 0.55  99755  23623  80.9 
1991  133734 0.58  107698  26036  80.5 
1992  135827 0.58  108830  26997  80.1 
1993  115058 0.50  91983  23075  79.9 
1994  128577 0.57  104351  24226  81.2 
1995  161995 0.72  130845  31150  80.8 
* = Temporary labour share of all employees within the social insurance system. 
Note that differences between Figures 2 and 3 and Table 3 are due to different ways of measuring 
temporary labour. 
 
Source: Rudolph and Schröder, 1997, page 106. 
 
 
Table 4: Temporary workers’ share of average monthly income, Germany 
 
Position  1980 1990 1995 
Total blue collar workers  79.3 73.2 65.4 
Low skilled workers  74.3 67.6 59.7 
Facharbeiter  82.8 77.5 71.4 
Total white collar workers  89.2 85.8 78.2 
Low skilled  73.4 67.7 59.4 
Skilled  82.3 76.5 70.0 
All employees/workers  77.4 71.7 63.4 
 
Source: Rudolph and Schröder, 1997, page 117. 



























































































Net income from business activities
Net income from wages
 
*Numbers including Eastern Germany 
 
In the wake of European-wide statistical harmonisation this aggregate is no longer being reported. 
There are therefore no numbers for 1998 and 1999. 
 
Data source: Bundesamt für Statistik, Zeitreihenservice 1998; own calculations. 
 

































Notes: Index 1976 = 100; numbers for December; temporary labour as defined in the 
Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz. 
 
Data source: ANBA, various volumes; own calculations. 






































Index 1976 = 100 
Data source: ANBA, various volumes; own calculations. 
 
 



















































Source: adapted from Schulten 1998, page 491. Bibliography 
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